Violence, Insecurity, and Crime in Development Thought

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Abstract

Ideas and practices of development and security have evolved separately in institutional, scholarly, and non-governmental forums. Recent attempts to re-think the “security–development” nexus have also encountered significant misunderstanding on both sides of the divide, hindering policies and programs to reduce violence, crime, and insecurity in ways that could promote human, social, and economic development. This nexus can be examined through the optics of academic concepts, empirical evidence, and programming experience. This chapter
traces the shifting understandings of the link between insecurity and development, to contextual recent debates about the “securitization” of development assistance. An overview of the scope, scale, and distribution of armed violence sets the stage for a more detailed examination of the evidence for the different pathways by which insecurity may undermine development. Finally, some programmatic responses are reviewed to identify how the development community attempts to deal with insecurity related to conflict, crime, and violence.

*Keywords:* conflict, violence, crime, development, insecurity, war
In 2000 the United Nations General Assembly approved its Millennium Declaration, an ambitious road map designed to galvanize international action to promote peace, security, and disarmament; development and poverty eradication; environmental protection; and human rights, democracy, and good governance. When translated into practical benchmarks for action, however, the eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) contained no reference to peace and security, and focused on “traditional” development goals such as eradicating extreme poverty and hunger, improving educational achievement, improving maternal health care, and reducing child mortality. One goal focused on environmental sustainability. No goals were set for two of the pillars of the Millennium Declaration: peace, security, and disarmament; and human rights, democracy, and good governance.

There were complex reasons for this slippage between lofty declarations and practical policies guidance, but it was also emblematic of the gulf between the twin discourses of “security” and “development.” Since the eighteenth century, ideas about, and practices of, development and security have evolved in disconnected institutional, scholarly, and non-governmental forums, an evolution that has hampered attempts to understand how violence and physical threats to security are inter-linked with broad development processes. Recent attempts to re-think the “security-development” nexus have encountered great resistance and significant misunderstanding, on both
sides of the divide. This has, among other things, hindered the development of effective policies and programs to reduce violence, crime, and insecurity in ways that could promote human, social, and economic development.

Although the relationship between armed violence, insecurity, and crime on the one hand, and human, social, and economic development on the other is complex and poorly understood, many studies point in the same direction. As the World Bank’s 2011 *World Development Report* concluded, no low-income fragile or conflict-affected country has achieved a single Millennium Development Goal (World Bank 2011: 1; see also Collier 1999). While focusing broadly on conflict-related violence, this message is also echoed by studies that focus on crime and other forms of violence (Skaperdas 2011; UNODC 2005). The implication is that insecurity, conflict, crime, and violence are development disablers.

This chapter examines this nexus between insecurity and development through three different optics: conceptual, empirical, and programmatic. It first traces the shifting understandings of the link between insecurity and development, and contextualizes the recent, and sometimes heated, debates about the “securitization” of foreign aid and development assistance. The second section presents an overview of the scope, scale, and distribution of armed violence in conflict and non-
conflict (including criminal) contexts, to set the stage for a more detailed examination of the evidence for the different pathways by which insecurity may undermine development. The final section reviews some of the programmatic responses within the development community to deal with insecurity related to conflict, crime, and violence.

**Whose security? What development?**

Tracing the relationship over several centuries between concepts as slippery as “development” and “security” is not straightforward. Other contributors to this volume (specifically, Harriss and Williams) deal with the changing understanding of development, which this chapter will treat as “progress in human well-being” (Stewart 2004: 261). “Security,” on the other hand, is a different matter, and to capture the impacts of conflict, crime, and violence on progress in human well-being (and vice versa), this chapter will adopt a broad understanding of threats to security, including both external (war and internal conflict) and internal (crime and inter-personal violence) dimensions, as well as of the objects of security (from state/national security to individual and human security concerns) (Buzan 1991). What will be kept constant is the focus
on “freedom from fear:” freedom from the threat of physical violence associated with conflict and criminal activity.

The first move to separate the discourses of security and development was taken by the economic thinkers associated with Adam Smith and early political economists (Rothschild 1995; Hettne 2010). Their promotion of liberty of commerce between states, and the freeing of individual enterprise within the state, was a direct disavowal of earlier doctrines of economic mercantilism, which associated national security with the accumulation of gold and silver with which to fight wars. Separating economic growth and individual well-being from state security policy was the first move in a long tradition of treating security concerns as distinct from development—and perhaps even considering too-great attention to security concerns a hindrance to development. Of course, economic theory was also part and parcel of the broader currents of the Enlightenment and liberal thought, which associated development with improvements in human well-being, emancipation, and progress, through the progressive application of reason to political and social life.

Throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the causal arrow ran one way: economic development was understood to contribute positively to the achievement of security from
violence and crime within the state (internal security) through the expansion of the state’s power and institutional reach. One of the main consequences was the progressive pacification of society through the elimination of domestic threats to governments and the maintenance of public order through the growth and increased efficacy of security institutions such as the police, gendarmes, and the criminal justice system. Of course, many other factors contributed to what Norbert Elias (1982) called the “civilizing process,” and it certainly had negative as well as positive aspects for the security of individuals, societies, and regimes. Overall, however, levels of crime and interpersonal violence decreased enormously from the seventeenth to the early twentieth century. This only confirmed the developmentalist view that socio-economic progress brought about improvements in human well-being in all relevant dimensions, and that ultimately it would bring forth the “better angels of our nature” to reduce violence between individuals and groups (Pinker 2011).

By the early twentieth century, a high level of everyday security from conflict, crime, and violence was taken for granted in Western Europe, and seen as wholly distinct from the processes of wealth creation and development as human progress. Optimistic analysts such as Norman Angell and Ivan Bloch argued at the turn of the twentieth century that economic prosperity and interdependence had made war obsolete or unthinkable, perpetuating the belief
that development and progress led to greater personal security, even to the level of national and international security (Angell 1909: Bloch 1899). Unfortunately, these predictions were proven terribly wrong in the trenches of the Great War, and the processes of modernization and industrial development also radically altered the capacity of states to threaten the security of their citizens, and that of other states, through mass warfare and state violence. This paradox of modernity—its ability simultaneously to create unprecedented domestic peace and total insecurity on a global scale—helps explain the twentieth-century preoccupation with inter-state war and large-scale state violence as the main threats to security (Krause 2009).

Development and human progress was, however, still regarded as the “solution” to war and insecurity, especially as influential analyses of the consequences of the Great War (such as John Maynard Keynes’ *The Economic Consequences of the Peace*) pointed presciently to the potentially destabilizing and conflict-producing consequences of failed or incorrect economic policies. Likewise, analyses of the protectionist policies of the 1930s associated them (and the Great Depression) with the rise of fascism and authoritarianism—and the Second World War (Kindelberger 1986). Not surprisingly, this vision of economic development as the solution to the problem of conflict and war informed the Keynesian orthodoxy of “embedded liberalism” that shaped the post-war Bretton Woods institutions (Ruggie 1982; Lombardi, this volume) and
the entire multilateral architecture (Jolly, this volume) dealing with reconstruction and development since 1945.

One important illustration of how security was considered as a subordinate or derivative good was the way in which mainstream economic thought considered investments in security as essentially unproductive—captured by the idea of a “guns versus butter” trade-off. Military spending and spending on personal security (through private security or personal protection) were considered inefficient, since they did not enhance productive capacity or (with the possible exception of “military Keynesianism”) generate growth. The empirical evidence is mixed, but on balance “suggests that there is little or no evidence for a positive effect on economic growth and that [military spending] is more likely to have a negative effect, or at best no significant impact at all” on economic growth (Dunne and Uye 2009).

This one-way view of how development and insecurity posed a dual problem. First, it presumed that conflict, crime, violence, and insecurity are exogenous to development processes, and that they constitute ruptures, pathologies or disruptions that are not integral to or inextricably intertwined with development itself. As several analysts have pointed out, the process of development itself may exacerbate insecurity and trigger violence, through rapid social change,
the unequal distribution of goods and growth, or differential access to benefits (Cramer 2007). Second, it recognized that the minimal conditions of security (in all its dimensions) were a precondition for development, especially in conflict-prone and fragile settings. The trade-off between “guns and butter,” if it exists, only kicks in after a baseline level of security has been established. Empirically, in many states in the post-colonial world, these basic conditions of security either did not exist or were compromised by large-scale conflict, crime, and violence, thus potentially undermining the promotion of development as a means to attenuate conflicts and enhance security. These observations ultimately reopened the debate on the connection between development and conflict, crime, and violence.

**Post-colonial development policy**

It was some time, however, before the bi-directional linkage between insecurity and development manifested itself in policy circles. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, national security and economic development concerns continued to occupy two distinct worlds of policy and practice. Geopolitical interests in the Cold War were not absent from the overall aims of development policy (“making the world safe from communism”), and both the United States and the Soviet
Union designed their different “aid architectures” around consolidating alliances and winning allies in the early years of decolonization. Development assistance, in this sense, has never been free from security concerns. The security under discussion was, however, that of the West (or East), and not necessarily that of the governments or citizens of newly independent states, and development policies often went hand in hand with some fairly destructive Cold War interventions (Bates 2009; Harriss, this volume). International institutions such as the World Bank, by contrast, excluded the national security concerns of recipient states from their mandates because these were seen as touching upon issues of national sovereignty. Defense spending, public order, political violence, state security forces—all were excluded from the ambit of development policy making, which concentrated first on technical assistance, and then on meeting basic human needs and promoting poverty reduction (and more recently on achieving the MDGs).

The mainstream understanding of the link between development on the one hand, and violence, crime, and insecurity on the other rested on two beliefs:
• Economic development was a *precondition* for security, and increased economic
development would reduce the incidence of conflict and violence within, and potentially
even between, states.

• The process of development and socio-economic change was more or less distinct from
the dynamics of conflict and insecurity within and between states.

These two beliefs were firmly anchored in the organizational culture and practices of
development organizations. As anyone who has visited development agencies, connected with
non-governmental development organizations, or spent time with development practitioners can
testify, the language of “conflict and insecurity” often triggers an allergic reaction, and is seen as
deeply threatening to the core mission of alleviating poverty and improving human well-being.
The “Birkenstocks versus boots” stereotype tapped into a deep clash of visions and missions.

But the shifting nature of contemporary security challenges, and some specific events, eroded the
neat compartmentalization of development and security concerns. Four significant changes can
be highlighted.
First, the end of the Cold War meant that local and regional dynamics of insecurity and conflict became more evident in such places as the Horn of Africa and the African Great Lakes region. The end of the Cold War also somewhat muted the geopolitical concerns shaping development assistance.

Second, the genocide in Rwanda served as a wake-up call in some quarters, as Rwanda was a “donor darling” in the early 1990s, receiving the largest levels of per-capita development assistance in sub-Saharan Africa. The massacre of more than 800,000 Tutsis by the genocidaire government suggested, however, that development policy that was not “conflict sensitive” could exacerbate conflicts, and find its entire raison d’être challenged (Uvin 1998).

Third, the changing nature of contemporary political violence—now almost entirely focused on internal, communal or civil conflicts, often between economically motivated armed groups such as the warlords in West Africa—meant that inter-state war essentially disappeared as a source of concern for policy-makers (Brzoska 2007; Kaldor 2006). The changed nature of contemporary conflicts, and their often large-scale impacts on the civilian populations, meant that their developmental consequences could not easily be ignored. This was perhaps best exemplified by the nearly decade-long conflict in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, which involved
armed groups and proxy forces from more than seven states, and cost upwards of five million lives, mainly because of increased mortality among the displaced populations of the region (Prunier 2009). The protracted nature of many internal conflicts, captured by the observation that around twenty percent of armed conflicts erupted into renewed violence within five years after a settlement, brought to the fore some of the challenges to achieving “progress in human well-being” in situations where state institutions were weak and conflict-prone (Suhrke and Samset 2007). An entire cottage industry has grown up around the analysis of failed, weak, or fragile states, and the governance and development challenges posed by these countries, home to more than 1.5 billion people, and recipients of roughly one-third of official development assistance (OECD 2011a: 11).

Finally, a more recent concern with the cross-border consequences and impacts of large-scale transnational organized criminal activity has emerged at the margins of the development agenda (UNODC 2005, 2007). As the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime put it, “The growth of global crime is a threat to the rule of law, without which there can be no sustainable world development.” (UNODC 2010: 19) The linkages are complex and under-studied, but the basic argument—that large-scale criminal activity corrodes state institutions, undermines effective
governance, and erodes the delivery of services and public goods—can be linked to the broader concerns of the development community.

At the conceptual level, a closer examination of how security and development might be linked was facilitated by the broadening of the definition of security from a narrow concern with the threat to state sovereignty posed by armed forces of external actors, to a concern with societal and human security: the security of people and communities within states (Hampson et al. 2001; Klingebiel 2006). This mirrored the shift in development policies and practices from attention to “development as macro-economic growth” to concerns with human and sustainable development. Using a human security lens, it became clear that the negative impacts of conflict, crime, and violence on development did not necessarily diminish when armed conflict ended. In fact, various studies suggested that the threat of insecurity was merely displaced—from war and conflict to crime and “disorganized violence” (including sexual and gender-based violence), and sometimes further along the spectrum to more subtle forms of repression (Eriksson Baaz and Stern 2010). One result was a cottage industry in publications and projects exploring the “security-development nexus” (Goodhand 2003; Tschirgi, Lund, and Mancini 2010; Stern and Öjendal 2010; Chandler 2007; Waddell 2006).
An integrated approach to conflict, crime, and violence

The previous section highlighted some of the ways in which sharp distinctions between different forms of violence and insecurity, whether caused by conflict or large- and small-scale criminal activity, are increasingly difficult to draw. One implication is that to assess the developmental impacts of violence and insecurity, analysts should adopt an integrated approach to conflict, crime, and violence to gain an overview of their global scope, scale, distribution, and changing nature.

There have been several recent attempts to make such comparative judgments, based on the large-scale aggregation of different indicators in such things as the State Fragility Index (Marshall and Cole 2011), the Failed States Index (Fund for Peace 2011), or the Global Peace Index (Institute for Economics and Peace 2012), all of which include aspects of conflict, violence, and insecurity as key components of their analysis. These efforts highlight the concentration of insecurity and state fragility in sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, and Central America, but do not isolate the ways in which insecurity and fragility contribute to (or are the result of) underdevelopment. Nevertheless, their findings all point in the same direction: those
regions of the world facing the greatest development challenges are also bedeviled by conflict, crime, and insecurity.

A more robust way of making comparisons and finding linkages between security and development is to focus on one indicator—lethal violence—as a proxy for overall levels of violence and insecurity. The 2011 report of the Geneva Declaration Secretariat, *Global Burden of Armed Violence 2011: Lethal Encounters*, does that, based on a composite and comprehensive cross-national data-set covering conflict and non-conflict lethal violence for the period 2004–09 (Geneva Declaration Secretariat 2011). Its main findings are highlighted in the map (Figure 22.1) and table (Figure 22.2) below. The map charts the distribution of death rates (per 100,000) from armed violence around the world, while the table presents the fifty-eight countries with rates of lethal violence greater than 10 per 100,000 (the global average rate of lethal violence is 7.9 per 100,000).

The first observation to make from the map and table is that the number of people dying in non-conflict settings is much greater than the number dying in conflicts: more than three-quarters of all victims of lethal violence die in non-conflict settings, while only about one-tenth die in direct conflict situations.
Figure 22.1: Global distribution of lethal violence (death rates per 100,000), 2004–09 annual average.


More than 526,000 people die violently each year, and countless more are injured and/or suffer from long-term or short-term disabilities or the psychological consequences of violence and insecurity. These violent deaths are concentrated geographically in Central America and parts of
sub-Saharan Africa. Most of the fourteen most violent countries (death rates greater than 30 per 100,000) are in these two sub-regions, as can be seen from the top entries in Figure 22.2. These fourteen countries have only 4.6 percent of the world’s population, but account for 25 percent of all violent deaths.

What is more important to note is that violence and insecurity are often as great or greater in non-conflict or non-war settings: only six of fourteen most violent countries were active conflict zones between 2004–09 (Iraq, Colombia, Sri Lanka, Central African Republic, Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo), and the levels of armed violence in non-conflict settings such as El Salvador and Jamaica are higher than in most war zones.
Figure 22.2: The most violent states (death rates per 100,000), 2004–09 annual average

These observations confirm the need to adopt a holistic approach to how conflict, crime, and violence affect development processes, and underline that the security-development nexus is not exclusively about armed conflict and post-conflict challenges. The changing nature of contemporary armed violence has blurred the line between armed conflict and crime, and between politically motivated and economically motivated violence. High levels of gang violence in El Salvador and Guatemala, vigilante justice in post-war and fragile states such as Liberia and Timor-Leste, post-election violence in Kenya and Côte d’Ivoire, and high levels of urban crime in cities such as Kingston, Jamaica and Rio de Janeiro, Brazil amply demonstrate how a distinction between armed conflict and criminal violence is increasingly difficult to make. The growth of networks of transnational organized criminal and non-state armed groups, as well as the resource-exploitation aspects of many contemporary conflicts (such as in the eastern DRC), also underline the weakness of these distinctions (Bannon and Collier 2003).

Different forms of armed violence are also often present simultaneously, and the same armed actors can be involved in politically motivated and economically motivated violence. Even in traditional conflict settings, such as Iraq since 2003, the seemingly arbitrary or criminal targeting of non-combatants by insurgents, militias, and sectarian groups may seem chaotic or random, yet a closer look at underlying patterns of violence suggests that violence also serves the political
purposes and goals of armed groups (Green and Ward 2009). In Somalia, pirates—generally pursuing private economic interests—are increasingly entangled in conflict dynamics, as local officials as well as opposing militias increasingly rely on the pirates’ firepower and strength to carry out protective and predatory tasks (Geneva Declaration Secretariat 2008: 16). And a focus only on political violence in a country such as Kenya misses the high levels of everyday victimization that might have greater development consequences than conflict-related violence.

**The development costs of conflict, crime, and violence**

A growing recognition that security from conflict, crime, and violence is a precondition for growth and development, and that persistent inequality, deprivation and underdevelopment can be a cause of conflict, violence, and insecurity, does not, however, demonstrate empirically how and under what conditions this relationship may hold. This section reviews what is known about these linkages and highlights the obstacles to making the case for precisely how conflict, crime, and violence may have a negative impact on development processes.
Despite the complex and fluid nature of most contemporary violence and insecurity, most analyses of the impact of conflict, crime, and violence on development and human well-being are not based on an integrated approach. Instead, research tends to rely upon two distinctions: the first concerning the level of organization of perpetrators (from highly organized collective groups to individuals), the second concerning the motivation behind the actions (from political/ideological to economic/material and individual psychological motivations). These two distinctions give rise to the matrix below (Table 1).
Table 22.1: Classifying conflict, crime, and violence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political/ideological</th>
<th>Economic/material</th>
<th>Psychological</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Collective</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inter-state war, civil</td>
<td>Warlords,</td>
<td>Riots, social</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>war, communal</td>
<td>organized criminal</td>
<td>violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>conflict between</td>
<td>groups, gangs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>informal armed groups</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Interpersonal</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some forms of</td>
<td>“Ordinary” crime</td>
<td>Domestic violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>terrorist action,</td>
<td>and inter-personal</td>
<td>and violence against</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>isolated attacks</td>
<td>violence</td>
<td>women</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Each of these types of violence and insecurity poses different challenges to realizing progress in human well-being. It has not been at all straightforward to demonstrate the negative impact different forms of insecurity might have on development, and under what conditions. More importantly, demonstrating a specific link does little to point to what should or could be done to alleviate the situation from a policy making or programmatic perspective. Research focusing on
at least four of the cells of the matrix has tended, though, to confirm that various forms of insecurity are associated with significant economic costs and development impacts.

Economists and development specialists such as Paul Collier, Frances Stewart, and Valpy FitzGerald have attempted to quantify some of the direct and indirect costs of violent armed conflict (Lichbach 1989; Skaperdas 2011). Although it might seem obvious that conflict destroys infrastructure, lives and social capital, the post-1945 economic miracles of countries such as Germany and Japan did lead some scholars to question how costly war was over the medium and long term. And some economists have pointed out that calculating the economic costs of armed conflict is beside the point—what was the “benefit” of liberating Europe from Hitler, or of the French Revolution, or of various revolutionary or liberation struggles? (Gutiérrez-Sanin 2009) In the longer run, an influential school of thought has argued that the development of the modern state, its bureaucracy, and its representative institutions owes much to the influence of the preparation for and fighting of wars (Tilly 1992), implying that war and conflict may have a long-term net developmental benefit.

Nevertheless, contemporary analysts at least seem to agree on the huge short-term development costs and consequences of armed conflict. One analyst puts the cost of a typical civil war at
50 billion USD (Collier and Hoeffler 2004) and estimates that an average armed conflict reduces GDP by 2.2 percent per year for at least five to seven years (Collier 1999), while a comprehensive review of various studies (Lindgren 2005) puts the average cost at 3.7 percent of GDP per year. From a “willingness to pay” point of view, Gregory Hess (2003) estimated that individuals who lived in conflict zones would sacrifice up to 8 percent of their income to live in peace—a considerable, if indirect, estimate of the burden of conflict.

In addition to macro-level economic costs, there are also micro-level impacts associated with particular sectors or development trajectories. For example, Neumayer (2004) highlights the negative impact of various forms of violence (including human rights violations) on tourism, finding a clear negative relationship. Other analysts have focused on such quantifiable impacts of conflict as lower levels of educational attainment, poor health outcomes, increased mortality levels of the under-five and other vulnerable groups (beyond violent deaths from conflict), migration and displacement, and chronic poverty (Ghobarah, Huth and Russett 2004; Justino 2006). Once again the evidence points in the same direction: that violent conflict has a negative impact on a range of indicators associated with development and human well-being.
The impact on development of large-scale criminal and non-conflict violence is less well studied. Organized crime and large-scale non-conflict violence does not have the same effects as armed conflict (there is less destruction of physical capital and infrastructure, state institutions remain functioning, and there is less migration and displacement), so the pathways by which it has an impact on development are less visible. In addition, almost all research has concentrated on one direction of the relationship: the degree to which developmental challenges such as poverty, inequality, or weak criminal justice systems contribute to increased levels of violent crime (Fajnzylber, Lederman, and Loayza 2002; Heinemann and Verner 2006; Neumayer 2005). Nevertheless, among its other human and social costs “crime has potentially deleterious consequences for growth, through reduced productivity and shortened planning horizons for investments in physical and human capital” (Soares 2009: 28).

There are many approaches to calculating these costs, and the more comprehensive the calculation method, the higher the estimate is likely to be. In some Central American countries where such calculations have been attempted, the costs are equivalent to several percentage points of GDP per year. In Guatemala, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) estimated health and lost productivity costs, private security costs, security and justice costs, and material losses at 7 percent of GDP per year. In El Salvador, the equivalent figure was 11 percent
of GDP (UNDP 2006). In Colombia, a country affected by conflict and non-conflict (especially urban) violence, the government estimated the cost of violence at around 18 percent of GDP in the early 1990s (Heinemann and Verner 2006: 2), and in Jamaica it was 3.7 percent of GDP (UNODC 2007). These figures are greater than the costs of conflict violence calculated above, although the differences are accounted for in part by the different methods used, as well as by the intensity of insecurity and violence in these four countries. There is comparatively little information on criminal violence in Africa, but the UN Office on Drugs and Crime concludes that “there is good reason to believe that this crime problem is undermining development efforts,” based on a qualitative assessment of the social, economic, and governance costs that criminal activity imposes (UNODC 2005: ix).

The figures for the costs of crime include all sorts of criminal activity, including interpersonal violence, gang-related violence, and petty crime (robbery, theft, assault, etc.). When focusing even on the lowest level of violence—interpersonal violence—the developmental costs can still be considerable, especially where such violence is pervasive or chronic. Criminal violence imposes direct costs in terms of policing, health care, and loss of accessibility due to high-violence “no go zones,” and represents a “tax” (via extortion) on legitimate business. One study of productivity losses due only to premature death from homicide in 90 countries estimated the
costs as at least 90 billion USD and perhaps up to 160 billion USD per year in 2004 (Geneva Declaration Secretariat 2008). Another specific example is the cost of domestic violence and violence against women, and although most work on its cost and impact has focused on the developed world (Day et al. 2005), the evidence of its widespread global nature suggests a major developmental burden (WHO 2005).

Regardless of which aspect of conflict, crime, or violence one looks at, insecurity in all its forms imposes significant development costs and is a “development disabler.” But the implications for how development programming (or national policies and programs) could be oriented toward preventing and reducing conflict and violence are not clear, and depend on whether one regards conflict, crime, and violence as exogenous to the development process; as “givens” in a socio-cultural context; as negative but unavoidable outcomes of the development process; or as an aspect of development that can (and should) be addressed as part of good development policy and practice. Certainly until recently, conflict, crime, and insecurity were regarded as regrettable but external aspects of the process of development, about which little could be done. This view has, however, been changing in the past decade.
Securitization of development

What have been the implications for development policies and programs of this changing understanding of the relationship between armed violence and development? Many donors developed both policy and programmatic responses addressing the link between insecurity and development, although there was also significant resistance in the development community to the perceived “securitization” of development. At the policy level, major development actors and agencies—including the World Bank, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the UK Department for International Development (DFID), the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), the German Development Institute, and others—all adopted specific policies to deal with work in conflict-affected or fragile states (OECD 2011a, 2008; DFID 2005; USAID 2005; SIDA 2006; Klingebiel 2006).

In general, these policy frameworks recognized that development challenges in fragile, violent, and insecure situations were severe, and that “development as usual” programming was impossible or inappropriate in such contexts. In some cases, explicit commitments have been made to enhance spending in insecure regions: DFID, for example, has pledged to direct
30 percent of its development assistance to fragile and conflict-affected states, and the Swiss Development Cooperation Agency has made a similar commitment (DFID 2012).

Beyond this, many development actors promoted specific programs and principles that focused on particular “drivers” of conflict, crime, and insecurity, implicitly or explicitly recognizing that insecurity needed to be addressed as part of good development practice. This included a focus on promoting security and justice sector reform, facilitating peace processes, supporting armed violence prevention and reduction work, and promoting state building (OECD 2012).

Two things are noteworthy about this programming agenda. First, tackling broad issues such as “state building” recognizes that development programming without attention to issues of governance, legitimacy and institution-building is not likely to have the desired long-term results. The idea of “state building,” with its resonance of colonial intervention at all levels of governance, represents, however, a huge and contested agenda (OECD 2011b). Second, efforts to work on specific aspects of security sector reform (SSR), including police training, military reform, and violence prevention and reduction, clearly transgresses the divide between development and security concerns of states and ruling elites, and reaches deep into the heart of the power structures of fragile and conflict-affected states (Sedra 2010).
These efforts to rethink the security–development nexus were not uncontested. At a subtle level, the nexus was reinterpreted as “promoting peace and security through development cooperation” (SIDA 2005, 2006), which essentially argued that development practitioners merely had to be sensitive to the ways in which their programs could contribute to broader security-building goals, rather than rethinking where, what, and how they programmed (DFID 2005). Co-optation was also sometimes coupled with more active resistance, as the potential subordination of development assistance and programming to geo-strategic imperatives gave rise to fears of the “securitization of development,” either in terms of where development assistance was directed, or how development programming was done. As Klingebiel notes, “a choice of countries in development policy geared solely or primarily to security or geostrategic thinking would lead to withdrawal from countries and areas of activity . . . which did not have any (immediately) obvious relevance to security” (Klingebiel 2006: 5). These fears were sometimes justified, as when Ministry of Defense officials argued that development assistance should be directed to places where states had deployed troops. At the programming level, the way in which development assistance was allocated and programmed could also be bent toward military and security imperatives, and the “risk of development policy being subordinated to objectives and
strategies with a military bias are plausible in many areas and verifiable in a number of examples.” (Klingebiel 2006: 5; DFID 2010)

**Future challenges**

The World Bank’s 2011 *World Development Report* focused on “conflict, security, and development,” and marked a watershed in high-level policy attention to the security–development nexus. Yet as this chapter suggests, untangling the many ways in which conflict, crime, violence, and insecurity are linked to development processes, affecting each other in reinforcing and reciprocal ways, is not an easy task. What is clear is that armed conflict and criminal violence act as “development in reverse,” and impose significant human, social, political, and economic costs on states and societies. Furthermore, the policy challenges—both for donor countries and for national violence prevention and reduction programs—are significant. Among other things, what is needed is a better micro- or local-level understanding of the complex social systems in which violence and crime are embedded, in order to identify clear entry points for policy and programming. Like all effective public policy, a strong evidence base is needed—and is still lacking—for most programming initiatives, with the result that sadly, “for
too many in the developing world, insecurity remains the norm and development a dream that cruelly eludes their grasp” (Bates 2009: 115).


2 A significant number (10 percent) are victims of unintentional homicide, while an estimated 4 percent of victims die during exchanges with law enforcement officials.
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